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THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: SAD
RECORD, DISMAL PROMISE
Michael J Glennon *
The death of Representative Clement Zablocki removes from the
continuing war powers debate at a most untimely moment the man
most responsible for the form and content of the War Powers Resolution.' Senator Jacob Javits and Senate co-sponsors of his version of the
Resolution surely can take equal credit for its enactment into law, but
the compromise agreed to by the 1973 Conference Committee was
largely the handiwork of Representative Zablocki. That Committee
dropped the "prior restraints" set forth in the Senate version which
would have spelled out, in legally binding terms, those instances in
which the President can introduce the armed forces into hostilities
without statutory authorization.' In its place the committee inserted a
non-binding, sense-of-the-Congress statement regarding the scope of
the President's independent powers. The Conference Committee also
retained the legislative veto set for the House version,4 which was absent in the Senate bill, and kept the House version's consultation requirement, 5 also absent in the Senate version. Finally, the Conference
Committee adopted a reporting requirement closely paralleling that of
the House version.6 Representative Zablocki's success in the Conference Committee was no doubt attributable to his belief, shared by other
House conferees, that no law would be preferable to the Senate bill,
and also to the corresponding belief on the part of Senate conferees
(with a few notable exceptions who actually preferred the House bill7)
that the House version was to be preferred to no law at all.' Given his
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law; Former Legal Counsel,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1976) (hereinafter cited as Resolution). The text of the War Powers Resolution is reproduced in Appendix, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 803 (1984).
2. S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3, 119 CONG. REc. 25,119.
3. Resolution § 2(c).
4. Resolution § 5(c).
5. Resolution § 3.
6. Resolution § 4.
7. See, e.g, S. REP. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35 (1973) (supplemental views of
Sen. Fulbright).
8. On the other hand, Senator Thomas Eagleton, a co-sponsor of the Senate bill, ar-
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role as chief architect of the conference report-which was enacted
without further amendment over President Nixon's veto-it is there-

fore appropriate that Representative Zablocki's last major discussion of
the Resolution be closely scrutinized.

His first principal conclusion-that "predictions that the Resolution would weaken the nation's ability to react to foreign policy crises
have proven unwarranted" 9 -is difficult to quarrel with. Arguments to

the contrary are for the most part unsupported and unsupportable assertions'0 resting upon the major premise that anything and everything
done by a President to halt the international communist conspiracy
must perforce be constitutional."
These reflexive proponents of unfettered Presidential discretion
fundamentally misapprehend the separation of powers concept. In12
place of the "divisiveness" engendered by the War Powers Resolution

they would substitute an "iron demand" of "cooperation" between
Congress and the President-a cooperation that is, upon analysis, the

cooperation of a valet with his master. 3 Brandeis,1 4 Corwin,' 5 and
other boat-rockers presumably are among those who would, if given
the chance, have played into the hands of Hanoi and Moscow.1 6
gued that the absence of prior restraints rendered the conference report ineffectual as a
check on presidential war-making. See 119 CONo.REc. 33,557 (1973).
9. Zablocki, War Powers Resolution: Its Past Record and Future Promise, 17 LoY.
L.A.L. REV. 579, 597 (1984).
10. See, e.g., Turner, The War Powers Resolution: Unconstitutional, Unnecessary,and
Unhelpful, 17 Loy L.A.L. REv. 683, 711 (1984). "In El Salvador, where President Reagan is
valiantly trying to dissuade Moscow and Havana from underwriting the overthrow of a
popularly elected government, the prospects for meaningful peace are being 'jeopardized by
the War Powers Resolution."'
11. See, e.g., id. at 711-12. "Virtually every time the president speaks or acts firmly to
deter the communists, his congressional critics cite the War Powers Resolution and tell the
word. . . 'He can't do that!'"
12. See, e.g., id at 692 (citing W.T. REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
AND CONGRESS 49 (1981)).
13. For my comments on Reveley's book, see 22 VA. J. INT'L ON L. 911 (1982).
14. The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the convention of 1787
not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to
the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the
people from autocracy.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
15. The Constitution, Corwin believed, provides "an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy." E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 171 (4th ed. 1957).
16. See Turner,supra note 10, at 697: "[A] strong case can be made that the divisiveness
in U.S. foreign policy during the 1970s was instrumental in Hanoi's decision to escalate the
fighting in South Vietnam, and in Moscow's decision to deploy Cuban soldiers to seize control of the Angolan revolution."
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"[C]ooperation should always be the goal."17 Whether one branch
should play war-powers manservant to the other is perhaps an issue
that could be argued either way, but it should suffice at this point to
note that the question seems to have been ventilated and resolved in
1789, and I see no point in reopening the argument today.
Representative Zablocki is correct in his first conclusion only because he is quite wrong in his second-the Resolution has not hampered the President's ability to react to foreign policy crises precisely
because it has not served to "restore the balance in the rights and responsibilities of the Congress and the President in the decision to commit troops."18 To the contrary, it has proven virtually ineffectual in
achieving that statutorily-stated objective.' 9 Representative Zablocki
observes that "there has been more non-compliance than compliance"2 0 by the executive branch. Although I am not certain that compliance or noncompliance can be neatly quantified, I quite agree that
the record of executive branch adherence to the requirements of the
Resolution has been dismal, and I am thus somewhat nonplussed by
Representative Zablocki's effusive assessment-set forth after a welldocumented recounting of "halfhearted" consultation, inadequate reporting, and overall footdragging-that the product is "excellent,"
"workable" and that its "credibility. . . has never been higher."'" If
credibility means the likelihood of compliance by future Presidents
who, all things considered, would prefer to forget it, it seems to me that
those chief executives will be on firmer ground than ever.
A truly colloborative war-making decisional framework between
the legislative and executive branches, it seems to me, can be achieved
only through a candid recognition of where and why Congress has
failed. Rather than argue who is at fault for the Resolution's failure,
however, I put forth the following criticism in the hope that it may
prove in some way helpful in preventing a recurrence of the mistakes,
misunderstandings, and misjudgments by the legislative branch that
have led to the Resolution's fecklessness during the first decade of its
operation. I emphasize congressional failures in the following comments because I think it is not terribly useful to rail against the executive branch, or to expect somehow to exhort or importune executive
branch officials into good faith observance. Separation of powers dis17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Zablocki, supra note 9, at 597.
Resolution, § 2(a).
Zablocki, supra note 9, at 597.
Id. at 598.
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putes are not won with congressional valentines. As Justice Jackson
put it, "there was worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon
that 'The tools belong to the man who can use them.' We may say that
power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress,
but only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its
fingers."22
Presidents thus cannot reasonably be expected to cede to the Congress any greater role in the decision-making process than the Congress
legitimately and clearly demands. Those are, I think, the two principal
reasons that the procedural requirements set forth in the War Powers
Resolution have not been respected: executive branch officials,
whatever some may occasionally have said for the purpose of avoiding
political confrontation, have by and large doubted the constitutional
legitimacy of the Resolution, and they have, in addition, been able to
comport executive branch behavior with those doubts because the mandate of the Resolution is in critical respects unclear. I shall examine
each point in turn.
Through Representative Zablocki's comments runs an implicit assumption of the Resolution's constitutionality. This surely should not
be surprising on the part of that measure's legislative godfather. What
is disappointing has been his repeated failure-and this applies to other
House and Senate sponsors as well-to be explicit about why the Resolution is constitutional, and in light of that failure, his seeming inference of bad faith on the part of executive officials-who may well have
come in good faith to an opposite conclusion. It simply does not do to
assert flatly that the Resolution is constitutional because the Congress
"receives the vast bulk of war powers under the Constitution, ' 23 or to
dismiss a claim of inherent presidential power to rescue endangered
United States nationals because it "turn[s] logic on its head" and was
"never accepted" by the "authors of the Resolution."'2 4 As a constitutional matter, the beliefs of the Resolution's authors are of the utmost
inconsequence. They are sworn to uphold the Constitution, true, but so
is the President, and what is needed from the Resolution's authors is a
clear and succinct and convincing statement as to precisely why it is
constitutional, which would in turn serve as an explanation to the President why he should feel bound to "take care" that the Resolution be
"faithfully executed." For notwithstanding the obvious arguments to
22. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
23. Zablocki, supra note 9, at 582.
24. Id. at 585.
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be made concerning a need for prior judicial invalidation before the
President is free to disobey the law, the undoubted response of an ingenuous executive who objects to the Resolution would be that the duty
of "faithful execution" extends only to laws not repugnant to the Constitution, a category of enactments that excludes the War Powers
Resolution.
This failure of the Resolution's sponsors to articulate lucidly the
reasons for its validity is disappointing because there exists a persuasive
case for its validity. The argument is, in the sheerest outline, that the
"fixed" powers approach to presidential power taken by the Supreme
Court in UnitedStates v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,25 UnitedStates v.
Pink,26 and UnitedStates v. Belmont 27 has given way to the very different "fluctuating" powers approach set forth initially by Chief Justice
Marshall in Little v. Barreme,28 reiterated by Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case),29 and formally
adopted by Justice Rehnquist in Dames & Moore v. Regan.3 ° Under
the latter approach, the scope of the President's power is a function of
the concurrence or non-concurrence of the Congress; once Congress
acts, its negative provides "the rule of the case."'" That analytical
framework, it seems to me, provides a general foundation for the congressional mandate of consultation and reporting as well as the imposition of a time limit upon the use of the armed forces in hostilities-all
of which, in the absence of a statement by the Congress, might fall
32
within a "zone of twilight.
25. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
26. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
27. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
28. 6 U.S. 170, 2 Cranch 157 (1804).
29. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
30. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
31. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 637. Professor Ides' argument, see Ides, Congress, ConstitutionalResponsibility
and the War Power, 17 Loy. L.A.L. Rav. 599 (1984), that the Resolution represents an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the President fails, I think, because the
delegation doctrine appears to be a dead letter, and in any event does not apply in the realm
of foreign relations. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). I
am troubled by the same argument, however, when made from a policy standpoint. Although the Resolution disclaims an intent to confer upon the President any authority which
he would not have had in its absence, Resolution § 8(d)(1), such a disclaimer is meaningless
if the practical effect of section 5(b) is to recognize implicitly executive authority to use the
armed forces in hostilities for up to 60 days without congressional approval. In light of the
absence of prior restraints, see supra text accompanying note 2, and the oblivion into which
section 2(c) has been cast, see infra text accompanying notes 33-34, Presidents seemed to
assume congressional concurrence for such action. I continue to believe that the Resolution
should be amended to include prior restraints, backed by funding prohibitions. See Glen-
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One reason for the continued confusion 32A is doubtless the wording of section 2(c). That section seems to be grounded upon the old
"fixed" powers theory, which is more supportive of presidential than of
congressional power. If the President's powers as "Commander-inChief' extend to "a national emergency created by attack upon the
United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces," 33 by
what authority can the Congress constitutionally preclude their use at
the end of a sixty-day period? The Resolution seems internally inconsistent: an attack on United States armed forces in West Germany
might be met without congressional authorization because the President possesses independent constitutional power, but that independent
power lasts only sixty days. Surely independent power, if the concept
has any meaning, implies immunity from congressional termination.
Authority to recognize a foreign country could not be limited to a certain time period, nor could authority to carry out certain pardons.
The matter is further complicated by the provision's failure to recognize any presidential power to rescue endangered United States nationals located abroad. A strong case might be made that the President
does possess such a power, albeit a narrow one: force may be used to
rescue endangered Americans as a last resort after all reasonable diplomatic efforts have failed, provided that the scope of hostilities is strictly
tied to and justified by the rescue objective. Such authority was recognized in the Senate version of the War Powers Resolution,34 and the
conference committee would have been wise to retain a carefully limited provision to that effect in the conference report. Because the military operations conducted in connection with the evacuation of Phnom
Penh and Saigon, the seizure of the Mayaguez, the Iranian hostage crisis, and the Grenada invasion all were rescue missions, however, the
section has come largely to be ignored-not only by executive branch
officials but by the Resolution's sponsors as well. Nowhere in his comments, it is worth noting, does Representative Zablocki express any disagreement with the initial introduction of the armed forces into
hostilities in Lebanon or Grenada-even though such actions are declared by section 2(c) to be flatly unconstitutional.
non, Strengthening the War Powers Resolution: The Casefor Purse-StringsRestrictions, 60
MrN*. L. REv. 1 (1975).
32.1 Authors Note: The confusion is illustrated in the following piece by Berdes and Huber, Making the War Powers Resolution Work: The View From the Trench (4 Response to
Professor Glennon), 17 Loy. L.A.L. Rav. 671 (1984), which fails to distingiush between the
two approaches.
33. Resolution § 2(c).
34. S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(3) (1973).
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If the absence of an articulated constitutional iationale for the
Resolution has failed to strengthen its legitimacy with the executive
branch, the articulation of palpably overreaching arguments for its
constitutionality has actually undermined it. I refer, here, specifically
to Representative Zablocki's contention that the Supreme Court's decision in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha35 does not
reach section 5(c) of the Resolution. I, too, wish that the Court had
disposed of Chadha on narrower grounds; had it not founded its opinion on the statute's infringement on the judicial role, as Justice Powell
wisely urged, it could at least have recognized that there exist different
categories of legislative vetoes to which different constitutional principles might apply. But the majority selected neither such approach,
holding instead that any action which has the purpose and effect of
altering the legal "rights, duties and relations of persons . . . outside
the legislative branch" is legislative in nature and therefore subject to
the requirements of the presentment clause.3 6
Unless this language somehow is viewed as obiter dictum-which
seems an impossible argument insofar as it represents precisely the test
applied by the Court to the congressional action at issue and the necessary base on which the invalidation of that action rests-it is hard to
see how section 5(c) escapes the Chadha bludgeon. That provision
clearly has the effect of altering the legal rights and duties of the President, and Representative Zablocki's two arguments to the contrary are
wholly unconvincing. First, he contends that, because questions concerning the validity of the Resolution would likely be regarded by the
Court as political, its provisions are somehow beyond the reach of constitutional limitations. Assuming, arguendo that a controversy concerning the Resolution does represent a policial question (and there
exists no readily apparent reason for viewing such a controversy as materially different from a dispute such as the Steel Seizure Case),3 7 it is
simply wrong that a holding of non-justiciability implies approval on
the merits. Few principles are more fundamental to constitutional jurisprudence than the distinction between justiciability and validity.
That a cause does not admit of judicial resolution has absolutely nothing to do with the constitutional validity of the conduct at issue.
Second, Representative Zablocki apparently contends that because
the War Powers Resolution expressly disclaims any intent to delegate
power to the Chief Executive, and because Chadha applies only to stat35. -

U.S. -,

103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).

36. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2784.
37. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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utes that delegate power, Chadha does not apply to the Resolution.
There are two problems with this argument. First, as noted above,
there is absolutely no reason to believe that the Court intended to restrict the sweep of Chadha to statutes that delegate power to the President; to the contrary, the language and reasoning of the opinion extend
to all legislation that subjects any presidential action to a legislative
veto. Second, statutory delegation is not the only source of presidential
war-making power: it is most emphatically not true that "Congress is
given the exclusive power to commit troops into hostilities," as the War
Powers Resolution itself expressly recognizes in section 2(c)(3)-and as
Representative Zablocki himself has seemingly acknowledged in approving the various uses of the armed forces to rescue endangered
American nationals, none of which was conducted pursuant to statutory authorization. Indeed, to the extent that the delegation issue is
relevant, it seems to cut in the opposite direction: insofar as section 5(c)
purports to subject non-delegated-which is to say independent-presidential power to a legislative veto, the provision is on weaker constitutional ground than the legislative veto struck down in Chadha.38
The second reason for half-hearted compliance by the Executive is
that fuller compliance has not been demanded-either legally by the
Resolution, or politically by members of Congress. It vastly understates the problem to describe it, as Representative Zablocki does, simply as a matter of "tepid congressional oversight. '39 To cast the issue
as one of oversight is to suggest that the need is merely for more hearings that generate more information. The problem has not been a lack
of information, but Congress' failure to act on information-to act,
specifically, by removing ambiguities in the Resolution and, more importantly, by living up to its responsibilities under the role it carved out
for itself under the Resolution. At least three ambiguities have undermined the proper operation of the Resolution.
First, the Resolution should be amended to set forth a definition of
"hostilities." In the absence of such a definition, officials of the executive branch and members of Congress engaged in a running argument
whether United States.military activities in Lebanon constituted "hostilities." When ten .IiMarines died in a twenty-day period after having
been fired upoi.yrgularly by hostile forces, it seemed utterly disingenuous to claini, 4s the Reagan administration did, that the hostilities test
was not met. Nonetheless, the term is not self-defining, and because
38. For the same reasons, I find Professor Ides' effort to distinguish the legislative veto in
the War Powers Resolution unpersuasive. See Ides, supra note 32, at 630-31.
39. Zablocki, supra note 9, at 587.
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the Resolution provides no guidance as to its meaning, a gradual escalation of hostilities can generate serious confusion as to the date on
which the time limit is triggered. Similarly, there is no clear indication
in the Resolution whether a variety of different activities are intended
to fall within the "hostilities" test, such as exposure to minefields, missile attack, chemical or biological agents, or neutron rays. If Congress
is serious about removing uncertainty and closing the door to semantic
circumvention by the executive branch, it must define the term
"hostilities." 4 0
Second, as Representative Zablocki indicates, consultation, time
after time, has been perfunctory at best. This is true largely because the
Executive has been allowed, time after time, to get away with perfunctory consultation. Aside from raising a political stink when such failure occurs-which congressional leaders have been loathe to do for
fear of being mistakenly seen by the public as somehow critical of a
military initiative-a Congress truly serious about consultation would
amend the Resolution to specify precisely who is to be consulted, to
make clear that "in every possible instance" does not include instances
that present alleged security problems, an l perhaps, to prohibit certain
uses of the armed forces in the absence of genuine consultation.
Third, and most important, is the vagueness of the reporting requirement, which has led to the Resolution's virtual unraveling. Although the Executive's record here is clearly at odds with the
Resolution's spirit, there is an argument to be made that presidential
reports have complied with its letter. The reason is that there is in fact
not one reporting requirement set forth in the Resolution, but three.
Only one-that required by section 4(a)(l)-triggers the sixty-day time
limit; those required by sections 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(3) are merely informational (although in the original House version of the Resolution they
too triggered the time limitations). The problem arises in that the three
situations overlap: facts that would require a report under section
4(a)(1) might also require a report under one of the two succeeding
paragraphs, and the Resolution contains no requirement that the President specify which of the three reports he is submitting. Only the Mayaguez report (submitted after the military operations had terminated
because they lasted less than forty-eight hours) referred expressly to
section 4(a)(1). Consequently, the other reports effectively left unanswered the critical question whether the sixty-day time limit had been
triggered.
40. See Glennon, The War PowersResolutiom More Loophole Than Law, The Christian
Science Monitor, Nov. 17, 1982, at 22.
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This fundamental flaw in the Resolution's procedural framework,
along with the difficulties concerning the consultation provision, the
"hostilities" terminology, and a variety of other problems, came to light
during hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1977.41
At that time, the Committee considered legislation which would have,
among other things, amended the Resolution to require that the President specify the paragraph of section 4(a) under which a report is submitted.42 But the measure was shelved because Representative
Zablocki and his House colleagues made it clear to senators concerned
about the Resolution's flaws that no amendment would be tolerated by
the House. It was important, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
was told, that the Resolution not be amended; for some inexplicable
reason, it still seemed a source of pride
to Representative Zablocki that
'43
the measure "remains unamended.
The failure of Congress to remedy this defect has had catastrophic
consequences. Following President Reagan's failure to submit a report
clearly triggering the sixty-day time limit when fighting in Lebanon
rapidly escalated in August and September of 1983, a dispute arose
between Congress and the Executive that posed a fundamental question: whether the sixty-day time limit constrained President Reagan's
use of the marines in Lebanon, which is part of the larger issue whether
he had the constitutional power to keep them in hostilities without congressional consent.
The congressional interest lay in establishing that the time limit
had been triggered and would require the marines' withdrawal, thereby
establishing that the President lacked sole constitutional authority to
use the marines in hostilities. The President's interests directly opposed
those of Congress. As Representative Zablocki describes, his representatives resisted any hint that the Resolution posed a restraint on
presidential war-making power, and they sought to establish instead
that it lay within his independent constitutional authority to keep the
marines fighting in Lebanon without congressional approval. As a
political matter, however, they recognized the obvious utility of procuring congressional endorsement of a foreign policy that represented considerable risk in the upcoming election year.
41. War Powers Resolution, 1977 Hearingson the OperationandEffectiveness ofthe War
Powers Resolution Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977).
42. See STAFF OF SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., 95TH CONG., 1ST SEsS., A BILL
TO AMEND THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTIONS (Comm. Print No. 2 1977).

43. Zablocki, supra note 9, at 597.
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The compromise? No presidential acknowledgement that the
sixty-day time limit is binding, and no presidential acknowledgment
that statutory authority is constitutionally required-but congressional
consent to keep the marines in hostilities for eighteen months, with no
guarantee that the President would respect even that longer time limit.
Congress obtained "major concessions"?" One wonders how
4
Representative Zablocki emerged from these "tough negotiations"
without agreeing to apologize for his sponsorship of the War Powers
Resolution.
The eighteen-month compromise does nothing to establish the legitimacy of the Resolution. The occasional references to the Resolution in the compromise are verbal window-dressing which together, as
Representative Zablocki puts it, purport to "use. . . the War Powers
Resolution to authorize the United States troop presence in Lebanon." 46 Of course the Resolution is utterly irrelevant to any such authorization-which could just as easily have been enacted in the
Resolution's absence. The "unique mechanism of section 5(b)"47 of the
Resolution had nothing to do with what actually was agreed to: the
sixty-day time period found by the Congress to have been triggered
would never expire because that period was superseded by the eighteen-month compromise. The statement was, in effect, an academic
contention which was agreed to by executive officials precisely because
it would never be more, and also because the provision sets forth only
the finding of the Congress that the Resolution's time limit had been
triggered. There is nothing in the compromise to suggest that the President agreed with Congress that the time limit had been triggered, and
indeed, President Reagan suggested in his signature statement that he
did not.48 Representative Zablocki writes that "the fact that President
44. Id. at 593.
45. Id.
46. Id. Author'sNote: How Berdes and Huber can, on the one hand, acknowledge that
the compromise "could have been enacted without the use of the War Powers Resolution,"
Berdes & Huber, supra note 32.1 at 678, yet contend on the other hand that citations to it
were more than verbal window-dressing, id., is not readily apparent. In any event I do not,
to reiterate, "advocate [the] approach" that the "Administration originally sought," id., and
I cannot state the approach I would have preferred any more clearly than it is already stated
in the text accompanying note 53.
47. Id. Authors Note: That the only legislative history to be cited in support of the
proposition that "the War Powers Resolution was written to enable Congress to invoke the
sixty-day period," Berdes & Huber, supra note 32.1, at 678, is a vague suggestion in the
House Committee report that Congress might "take into account" the failure of the President to report, id., demonstrates I think, that the argument is essentially frivolous.
48. President's Statement on Signing S.J. Res. Into Law, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1422-23 (Oct. 13, 1983). Rep. Zablocki and his colleagues apparently had been told during
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Reagan signed the legislation into law represented an extremely meaningful Executive Branch acceptance of the War Powers Resolution
.... [P]residential signature. . . represents a grudging but richer acceptance of the reality of the Resolution. . ."9 Whether the "reality"
of the Resolution is "richer" is hard to argue, but the notion that presidential signature connotes agreement-particularly in the case of the
President's expressed disclaimer upon signing the measure-is absolute
nonsense. Presidents have often signed bills about which they had constitutional reservations, frequently, for example, in the case of measures
containing legislative vetoes. But as Congress found out in Chadha, a
presidential signature meant nothing; the argument was, in fact, expressly and summarily dismissed by the Supreme Court. 0
It is worth pointing out, in addition, that the Lebanon compromise
contained nothing to suggest that, in its absence, the President would
be without constitutional authority to use the marines in hostilities in
Lebanon. The Administration never acknowledged that statutory authorization is constitutionally required. To the contrary, Secretary of
State George P. Shultz testified that the compromise was not constitutionally necessary and, in fact, that the administration just might feel
free to keep the marines in Lebanon beyond the eighteen-month
this represents, for Representative Zablocki, a
limit. 1 Nonetheless, all
"positive experience."'52 Had the congressional negotiators had the
backbone, they could easily have protected the congressional constitutional prerogative. They could have told the President's representatives
that they had a choice: either file a report expressly citing section
4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution and recognize the constitutional
necessity for statutory authorization, or go it alone-and be prepared to
have President Reagan take the heat himself when the casualties in
Lebanon mount.53
the negotiations that the President would make such a statement upon signing the
compromise.
49. Zablocki, supra note 9, at 595.
50. -U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2779 (1983). "The assent of the Executive to a bill which
contains a provision contrary to the Constitution," the Court said, "does not shield it from
judicial review." Id. at 2779 n.13.
51. War Powers Bill Wins InitialApproval, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1983 at A16. Author'r
Note: It is comforting to know that the Administration "privately made clear" to Berdes
and Huber that the Lebanon compromise "would be observed." Berdes & Huber, supra
note 32.1, at 678. Would that they had relayed this intelligence to the many members of the
House and Senate who were discomfited by the public testimony of Secretary of State
Shultz, who apparently was misinformed.
52. Zablocki, supra note 9, at 596.
53. See Glennon, Some Compromise, The Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 24, 1983 at
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In the face of the administration's truculence, however, Congress'
response carried all the logic of a homeowner's allowing an arsonist to
torch his house so as to avoid the humiliation of having it done without
his consent. To paraphrase Justice Hugo Black, another such "positive
54
experience" and we shall be undone.
Given the disposition of the Lebanon war powers dispute, Representative Zablocki could hardly have been surprised that, when invading Grenada, the President again "skirted section 4(a)(1)
requirements."5 5 Thanks in large part to the efforts of Representative
Zablocki, a most useful precedent had been established in the Lebanon
compromise: the President has the option of triggering or failing to
trigger the sixty-day time limit, and, if he elects not to do so, the Congress will exercise the same choice. Of course this procedure stands the
Resolution's methodology on its head: the whole point was that the
triggering of the Resolution's time limits would be automatic, that no
discretion would inhere in the Executive, and that Congress, as a consequence, would not be involved at all at the outset of the process-except for consultation. As a result of Representative Zablocki's efforts to
"invoke" the War Powers Resolution, a measure that was intended to
be self-invoking, Congress now found itself, upon the invasion of Grenada, precisely where it would have been in the absence of the Resolution: attempting to enact a statutory time limitation. Rather than
confronting the issue in a more dispassionate setting sixty days after the
triggering event, Congress found itself hit by a wave of pro-Executive
emotion when it attempted to state statutorily that the time period had
been triggered. Even members of Congress who, like Congressman
Zablocki, fell over themselves attempting to avoid "casting judgment
on the foreign policy merits of the Grenadan invasion '5 6 faced the
specter of being labeled boat-rockers. And, as Representative Zablocki
notes, no triggering legislation was ever enacted. The "threat of congressional action" 57 became more hollow as the days went on, demonstrating the ineffectiveness "of the Resolution, in forcing collective
decision on troop commitment ... "I'
In his belated recognition that amendment of the Resolution is re54. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
55. Zablocki, supra note 9, at 596.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 597.
58. Id. Author's Note: Messrs. Berdes and Huber seem not to have understood the point
of this paragraph. I do not suggest that Congress "should have confronted the Grenada
issue" sixty days after the triggering event. Berdes & Huber, supra note 32.1, at 679. To the
contrary, the whole point is that, had the Resolution worked properly and had the Congress
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quired, Representative Zablocki finally seemed willing to acknowledge
at least two of its more serious shortcomings. The most serious problem-the role reversal between the President and the Congress that has
occurred at the outset of the process-can be overcome by requiring
specificity in presidential reports. Similarly, Congress can strengthen
its case for meaningful consultation by tightening up the requirements
of section 3.
But these and other modifications59 of the Resolution will not, in
themselves, "insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress
and the President will apply to the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities.
...
-"o Ten years later, it has become
clear that the Resolution's sponsors were naive to believe that any law
could achieve that objective. The most that a statute can do, however
artfully drawn, is to facilitate the efforts of individual members of Congress to carry out their responsibilities under the Constitution." To do
that requires understanding, and it also requires courage: it demands
an insight into the delicacy with which our separated powers are balanced, and the fortitude to stand up to those who would equate criticism with lack of patriotism. For a Congress comprised of such
members, no War Powers Resolution would be necessary; for a Congress without them, no War Powers Resolution will be sufficient.

wished to consider a statutory extension of the sixty-day period, then that issue could have
been considered later, in "a more dispassionate setting."
59. See generally Glennon,supra note 32. Author'sNote: I may have missed something,
but in re-reading this article I find nothing advocating the Resolution's "dismantlement,"
Berdes & Huber, supra note 32.1, at 679-80. I find only the preceding phrase and a sentence
in note 32,supra, manifesting my "nostalgic, almost religious, devotion to the so-called 'recognized powers' section of the Senate version of the War Powers Resolution," Berdes &
Huber, supra note 32.1, at 673. I admit to believing that the "prior restraints" approach of
the Senate was in 1973, and is today, better than that of the "subsequent limitations" approach of the House (which is the approach of the Resolution). I argued this point in 1975.
See Glennon,supra note 32. It is apparently my 1975 article to which their article responds,
leaving me somewhat bewildered concerning their contention that I do "not tell [them] what
[my] alternative would be." Berdes & Huber, supra note 32.1, at 681.
60. Resolution § 2(a).
61. See Glennon, The War PowersResolution Ten Years Later: MorePolitics Than Law,
78 AM. J. INT'L L., - (1984).

